Version 3 (modified by 16 years ago) (diff) | ,
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Configuration Examples
This page gives several fedd
layouts and the configuration files that support them. You can take them either as starting points from which to create your own configuration or as demonstrations of how the parameters in the configuration files and databases work together.
Static Access Only on Users
This is the simplest configuration of fedd
, used to allow users of other testbeds to use resources from yours using pre-configured projects. The layout assumes that for each three-level name you are willing to allow to use your testbed, you have set up a project that already has proper keys installed. Because no local projects or local users need to be modified, fedd
does not need access to boss.
A commented fedd.conf (installed in /usr/local/etc/fedd.conf
) on users.isi.deterlab.net
might look like this:
[globals] # Identify this fedd by the fedid encoded as a certificate file (user file protections to protect it) These types of node are not accessible by everyone restricted: rpc_30cert_file: /usr/local/etc/fedd/fedd.pem # Provide service on port 23235 services: 23235 [access] # Keep access state (which experiments are live) in this file # Be sure it is writeable by the fedd user access_state: /var/db/fedd/deter_access.state # Parameters for remote fedds to instantiate experiments boss: boss ops: users domain: .isi.deterlab.net fileserver: fs eventserver: event-server # This machine's URI to discriminate proxy requests testbed: https://users.isi.deterlab.net:23235 # The database that maps requester to local access projects (shown below) accessdb: /usr/local/etc/fedd/deter_access [allocate] # do not check allocations. Assume that the static configuration of projects is correct. allocation_level: none # this could really be omitted. Without modifications, there's no state to keep allocate_state: /var/db/fedd/deter_allocate.state
In addition the access component accessdb in /usr/local/etc/fedd/deter_access
might be similar to this one (the rules could be more explicit or looser, for example):
# Overrides for the connector image and type attribute: connectorImage value: FBSD7-TVF attribute: connectorType value: pc3000_tunnel # map users from the given testbed in the Deter group into the local Federation project. Experiments will # be created by the local user "fedd" and accessable by users with the same name as requesters. This # will require coordination. (fedid:ce90957dd5b7d20f9c3890c4599313b7f1cf31ea, Deter, <any>) -> (Federation, fedd, <same>)
Dynamic Keying only on Boss
In this case there is still one running fedd
, but it runs on boss
, where it can add keys to user accounts and change project permissions. While projects and users need to be kept in sync, the user keys need not. The changes here are largely in the allocation section of the global configuration.
The configuration assumes that patched versions of addpubkey
and grantnodetype
have been installed as taddpubkey
and tgrantnodetype
in /usr/testbed/sbin
as described in the installation section.
[globals] # Identify this fedd by the fedid encoded as a certificate file (user file protections to protect it) cert_file: /usr/local/etc/fedd/fedd.pem # Provide service on port 23235 services: 23235 [access] # Keep access state (which experiments are live) in this file # Be sure it is writeable by the fedd user access_state: /var/db/fedd/deter_access.state # Parameters for remote fedds to instantiate experiments boss: boss ops: users domain: .isi.deterlab.net fileserver: fs eventserver: event-server # This machine's URI to discriminate proxy requests (NB: this runs on boss) testbed: https://boss.isi.deterlab.net:23235 # The database that maps requester to local access projects (shown below) accessdb: /usr/local/etc/fedd/deter_access [allocate] # Allow keys and node types to be extended. allocation_level: dynamic_keys # Keep track of keys added and node types granted so that they can be removed when done. allocate_state: /var/db/fedd/deter_allocate.state # Use the extended commands grantnodetype: /usr/testbed/sbin/tgrantnodetype addpubkey: /usr/testbed/sbin/taddpubkey
In addition the access component accessdb in /usr/local/etc/fedd/deter_access
might be similar to this one (the rules could be more explicit or looser, for example):
# Overrides for the connector image and type attribute: connectorImage value: FBSD7-TVF attribute: connectorType value: pc3000_tunnel # Nodes of this type are not generally accessible restricted: rpc_3000 # Additional keys may be added to these groups. Note that when a user with emulab-ops as the project in their # three-level name accesses the testbed, the fedd project will be given access to the restricted node type # rpc_3000. Requesters with Deter as the project will be unable to successfully request access to such nodes. (fedid:ce90957dd5b7d20f9c3890c4599313b7f1cf31ea, Deter, <any>) -> (Federation, fedd, <same>) (fedid:ce90957dd5b7d20f9c3890c4599313b7f1cf31ea, emulab-ops, <any>) -> (Federation, fedd:rpc_3000, <same>)
Dynamic Keying with Distributed Operation on Users and Boss
In this case two fedd
s are running. The one on users accepts and evaluates access requests but calls out to the fedd
on boss to do the manipulation of local testbed state. Boss may choose to firewall all other hosts (except users) away from the fedd port, though the fedd
access controls will also protect access. The situation looks like this:
Attachments (3)
-
2fedds.png (12.1 KB) - added by 16 years ago.
Example 2 fedd layout
-
user_fedd.png (11.7 KB) - added by 16 years ago.
Single fedd on users
- boss_fedd.png (12.0 KB) - added by 16 years ago.
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